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B IOMETRICS are an important and widely usedclass of methods for identity verification and ac-
cess control. Biometrics are attractive because they are
inherent properties of an individual. They need not be
remembered like passwords, and are not easily lost or
forged like identifying documents. At the same time, bio-
metrics are fundamentally noisy and irreplaceable. There
are always slight variations among the measurements of a
given biometric, and, unlike passwords or identification
numbers, biometrics are derived from physical charac-
teristics that cannot easily be changed. The proliferation
of biometric usage raises critical privacy and security
concerns that, due to the noisy nature of biometrics,
cannot be addressed using standard cryptographic meth-
ods. In this article we present an overview of “secure
biometrics”, also referred to as “biometric template pro-
tection”, an emerging class of methods that address these
concerns.
The traditional method of accommodating measure-
ment variation among biometric samples is to store
the enrollment sample on the device, and to match it
against a probe provided by the individual being au-
thenticated. Consequently, much effort has been invested
in the development of pattern recognition algorithms
for biometric matching that can accommodate these
variations. Unfortunately, this approach has a serious
flaw: An attacker who steals or hacks into the device
gains access to the enrollment biometric. In conventional
password-based systems, this type of problem can be
mitigated by storing a non-invertible cryptographic hash
of the password rather than the password itself. However,
cryptographic hashes are extremely sensitive to noise,
and thus incompatible with the inherent variability of
biometric measurements. Therefore, the above approach
used for securing passwords is ill-suited to biometric
security.
The loss of an enrollment biometric to an attacker is a
security hazard because it may allow the attacker to gain
unauthorized access to facilities, sensitive documents,
and the finances of the victim. Further, since a biometric
signal is tied to unique physical characteristics and the
identity of an individual, a leaked biometric can result
in a significant loss of privacy. In this article, we refer
to a security breach as an event wherein an attacker
successfully accesses a device. We refer to a privacy
breach as an event wherein an attacker partially, or
completely, determines the victim’s biometric. Security
and privacy breaches represent distinct kinds of attacks.
Significantly, the occurrence of one does not necessarily
imply the occurrence of the other.
Addressing these challenges demands new approaches
to the design and deployment of biometric systems. We
refer to these as “secure biometric” systems. Research
into secure biometrics has drawn on advances in the
fields of signal processing [1–6], error correction cod-
ing [7–11], information theory [12–15] and cryptogra-
phy [16–18]. Four main architectures dominate: fuzzy
commitment, secure sketch, secure multiparty compu-
tation, and cancelable biometrics. The first two archi-
tectures, fuzzy commitment and secure sketch provide
information-theoretic guarantees for security and privacy,
using error correcting codes or signal embeddings. The
third architecture attempts to securely determine the
distance between enrollment and probe biometrics, using
computationally secure cryptographic tools such as gar-
bled circuits and homomorphic encryption. The final ar-
chitecture, cancelable biometrics, involves distorting the
biometric signal at enrollment with a secret user-specific
transformation, and storing the distorted biometric at the
access control device.
It is the aim of this article to provide a tutorial
overview of these architectures. To see the key com-
monalities and differences among the architectures, it
is useful to first consider a generalized framework for
secure biometrics, composed of biometric encoding and
decision-making stages. For this framework, we can
precisely characterize performance in terms of metrics
for accuracy, security and privacy. Furthermore, it is vital
to understand the statistical properties and constraints
that must be imposed on biometric feature extraction
algorithms, in order to make them viable in a secure
biometric system. Having presented the general frame-
work, and specified constraints on feature extraction,
we can then cast the four architectures listed above
as specific realizations of the generalized framework,
allowing the reader to compare and contrast them with
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2ease. The discussion of single biometric access control
systems naturally leads to questions about multi-system
deployment, i.e., the situation in which a single user
has enrolled his or her biometric on multiple devices.
An analysis of the multi-system case reveals interesting
privacy-security tradeoffs that have been only minimally
analyzed in the literature. One of our goals is to highlight
interesting open problems related to multi-system de-
ployment in particular and secure biometrics in general,
and to spur new research in the field.
I. A UNIFIED SECURE BIOMETRICS FRAMEWORK
Secure biometrics may be viewed as a problem of
designing a suitable encoding procedure for transforming
an enrollment biometric signal into data to be stored on
the authentication device, and of designing a matching
decoding procedure for combining the probe biometric
signal with the stored data to generate an authentication
decision. This system is depicted in Figure 1. Any
analysis of the privacy and security tradeoffs in secure
biometrics must take into account not only authenti-
cation accuracy but also the information leakage and
the possibility of attacking the system when the stored
data and/or keys are compromised. At the outset, note
that in authentication, a probe biometric is matched
against a particular enrollment of one claimed user. This
differs from identification, in which a probe biometric
is matched against each enrollment in the database to
discover the identity associated with the probe. These
are distinct but closely related tasks. For clarity, our
development focuses only on authentication.
A. Biometric Signal Model
Alice has a biometric — such as a fingerprint, palm-
print, iris, face, gait, or ECG — given by nature, that
we denote as Λ0. To enroll at the access control de-
vice, Alice provides a noisy measurement ΛE of her
underlying biometric Λ0. From this noisy measurement,
a feature extraction algorithm extracts a feature vector,
which we denote by A. At the time of authentication,
Alice provides a noisy measurement ΛP , from which
is extracted a probe biometric feature vector B. In an
attack scenario, an adversary may provide a biometric
signal Φ, from which is extracted a biometric feature
vector C. We note here that most theoretical analyses
of secure biometric systems omit the feature extraction
step and directly work with (A,B,C) as an abstraction
of the biometric signals. For example, it is convenient to
analyze models in which (A,B,C) are binary vectors
with certain statistical properties. We will elaborate on
the feature extraction process in an upcoming section, but
for the exposition of the system framework, we directly
use the feature vectors A and B (or C) rather than the
underlying biometric signals ΛE , ΛP and Φ.
B. Enrollment
Consider a general model in which a potentially
randomized encoding function F (·) takes the enrollment
feature vector A as input and outputs stored data S ∈ S,
|S| <∞, which is retained by the access control device.
Optionally, a key vector K ∈ K, |K| < ∞, may also
be produced and returned to the user, or alternatively,
the user can select the key K and provide it as another
input to the encoding function. The arrow in Figure 1(a)
is shown as bi-directional to accommodate these two
possibilities, viz., the system generates a unique key
for the user, or the user selects a key to be applied in
the encoding. The enrollment operation (S,K) = F (A)
(or S = F (A,K) in the case where the key is user
specified) can be described, without loss of generality, by
the conditional distribution PS,K|A, which can be further
decomposed into various forms and special cases (e.g.,
PS|A,KPK|A, PS|A,KPK, PK|A,SPS|A, etc.) to specify
the exact structure of how the key and stored data are
generated from each other and the enrollment biometric.
Depending upon the physical realization of the system,
the user may be required to remember the key or carry
the key K, e.g., on a smart card. Such systems are called
two-factor systems because both the “factors”, namely
the biometric and the key, are needed for authentication
and are typically independent of each other. In this
model, keyless (or single-factor) systems follow in a
straightforward way by setting K to be null; these do
not require separate key storage (such as a smart card).
C. Authentication
As shown in Figure 1(a), a legitimate user attempts to
authenticate by providing a probe feature vector B and
the key K. An adversary, on the other hand, provides a
stolen or artificially synthesized feature vector C and
a stolen or artificially synthesized key J. Let (D,L)
denote the (biometric, key) pair that is provided during
the authentication step. We write
(D,L) :=
{
(B,K), if legitimate,
(C,J), if adversary.
The authentication decision is computed by the binary-
valued decoding function g(D,L,S). In keyless systems,
the procedure is similar with K, J, and L removed from
the above description. To keep the development simple,
we considered only a single enrollment A and a single
probe D above; in practice, using multiple biometric
3measurements during the enrollment or decision phase
can improve the authentication accuracy [19].
D. Performance Measures
The model explained above provides a generalized
framework within which to design, evaluate and imple-
ment secure biometric authentication systems. As we
shall see later, this framework accommodates several
realizations of secure biometrics. It can encapsulate
several ways of implementing the encoding and decoding
functions, various biometric modalities, and even differ-
ent kinds of adversaries – computationally unbounded
or bounded, possessing side information or not, and so
on. Furthermore, in spite of its simplicity, the framework
permits us to define precisely all performance measures
of interest, including conventional metrics used to mea-
sure accuracy, as well as newer metrics needed to assess
security and privacy.
Conventionally two metrics are used to measure the
matching accuracy of biometric systems. The first is
the False Rejection Rate (FRR), which is the prob-
ability with which the system rejects a genuine user
(the missed detection probability). The second is the
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) which is the probability
that the system authenticates a probe biometric that
came from a person different from the enrolled (and
claimed) identity. For any given realization of a biometric
access control system, there exists a tradeoff between
these two quantities as illustrated in Figure 1(b). It is
not possible simultaneously to reduce both beyond a
fundamental limit governed by the statistical variations
of biometric signals across users and measurement noise
and uncertainties. The performance of a biometric access
control system is typically characterized by its empirical
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which is
a plot of the empirical FRR against the empirical FAR.
Based on the ROC curve, the performance is sometimes
expressed in terms of a single number called the Equal
Error Rate (EER) which is the operating point at which
FAR equals the FRR, as is depicted in Figure 1(b).
In addition to the two conventional metrics discussed
above, in the following we present three performance
measures that allow us to characterize the privacy, se-
curity and storage requirements of a secure biometric
system.
The first is Privacy Leakage. This is the number of
bits of information leaked about the biometric feature
vector A when an adversary compromises the stored
data S and/or the secret key K. An information theo-
retic measure of privacy leakage is mutual information
I(A;V) = H(A) − H(A|V), where V represents the
information compromised by the adversary and may
equal S, K, or the pair (S,K). The two terms on the
right hand side are, respectively, the entropy of A and
the conditional entropy (or “equivocation”) of A given
the leaked data V. As H(A) quantifies the number of
bits required to specify A and H(A|V) quantifies the
remaining uncertainty about A given knowledge of V,
the mutual information is the reduction in uncertainty
about A given V [20]. Mutual information (or equiv-
alently, equivocation) provides a strong characterization
of the privacy leakage [12–14, 21].
The accuracy with which an adversary can reconstruct
the original biometric is often used as an additional
performance metric [22], and sometimes as a loose
proxy for privacy leakage. Driving privacy leakage (as
defined by mutual information) to zero necessarily max-
imizes the adversary’s reconstruction distortion. This
is due to the data processing inequality and the rate-
distortion theorem of information theory [20]. However,
for many commonly encountered distortion functions
that measure the average distortion per component, e.g.,
the normalized Hamming distortion, the reverse is not
true, i.e., maximizing the adversary’s distortion does
not necessarily minimize privacy leakage in terms of
mutual information. To illustrate how this could happen,
consider a scheme which reveals to the adversary that
the user’s (binary) biometric feature vector is equally
likely to be one of two possibilities: the true vector or
its bit-wise negation. The adversary’s best guess would
get all bits correct with probability 0.5 and all incorrect
with probability 0.5. Thus, under a normalized Hamming
distortion measure, the expected distortion would be 0.5,
i.e., the same as guessing each bit at random. However,
while the expected distortion is maximum, all but one
bit of information about the biometric is leaked. The
mutual information measure would indicate this high
rate of privacy leakage. Thus reconstruction distortion
cannot be a proxy for privacy leakage although the two
are loosely related as discussed above.
The second performance measure is the Successful
Attack Rate (SAR). This is the probability with which a
system authenticates an adversary instead of the victim,
where the adversary’s knowledge has been enhanced by
some side information consisting of the victim’s biomet-
ric, stored data, and/or key. The SAR is always greater
than or equal to the nominal FAR of the system. This
follows because the side information can only improve
the adversary’s ability to falsely authenticate.
The above definition of security is different from that
used in some of the literature. Our definition of SAR
is specific to the authentication problem, quantifying
the probability that an adversary gains access to the
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Fig. 1. (a) Secure biometrics involves encoding the biometric features before storage at the access control device. The authentication
decision checks whether the probe biometric is consistent with the stored data. For clarity, the figure depicts the feature vectors extracted from
biometrics, rather than the underlying biometric measurements. (b) Typical tradeoffs between FAR and FRR in biometric-based authentication
systems. In general, incorporating security and privacy constraints comes at the price of diminished accuracy, which is manifested as a shift
of the nominal ROC curve (blue) away from the axes (red).
system. In other settings, security has been related to the
difficulty faced by an adversary in discovering a secret
that is either a function of the biometric, or is chosen at
enrollment, see, e.g., [12–14]. The motivation for using
SAR as the security metric in our development is two-
fold. First, as in [12–14], it can capture the difficulty of
discovering the user’s secret and thereby gaining access
to the system. Second, it is conceptually related to the
FAR; the SAR defaults to the FAR when the adversary
has no side information. Given a choice of two systems,
and knowledge of the possible attack scenarios, a system
designer may prefer the system with the higher FAR if
it provides the lower SAR of the two.
The third and final measure is the Storage Requirement
per biometric. This is the number of bits needed to
store S and, in two-factor systems, K. For some secure
biometrics realizations, this can be much smaller than
the number of bits used to represent A. For methods
involving encryption, this value can be much larger
owing to ciphertext expansion. For detailed mathematical
definitions of these metrics, we refer the reader to [21].
Unlike the FAR/FRR tradeoff which has been exten-
sively studied, the inter-relationships between privacy
leakage, SAR and the FAR/FRR performance are less
clearly understood. It is important to realize that privacy
leakage and security compromise (quantified by the
SAR) characterize distinct adversarial objectives: An
adversary may discover the user’s biometric without
necessarily being able to break into the system. Alter-
natively, an adversary may illegally access the system
without necessarily being able to discover the user’s
biometric.
II. PROCESSING OF BIOMETRIC SIGNALS
Let us first consider the properties of biometric feature
vectors that would ensure good accuracy, i.e., a low FRR
and a low FAR. It is often useful to think about bio-
metric variability in terms of communications: any two
biometric measurements can be regarded as the input and
output of a communication channel. If the measurements
are taken from the same user, they will typically be quite
similar, and the channel has little “noise”. In contrast, if
the measurements come from different users, they will
typically be quite different, and the channel noise will be
large. A “good” feature extraction algorithm must deliver
this type of variability among biometric samples – strong
intra-user dependence and weak inter-user dependence.
A simple case is binary features where the relationship
between feature vectors can be modeled as a binary bit-
flipping (“binary-symmetric”) channel. This is depicted
in Figure 2 where the crossover probability between
feature bits of the same user is small (0 < p  0.5),
and that between feature bits of different users is large
(p′ ≈ 0.5). Smaller feature vectors are also desirable due
to lower storage overhead.
In practice, the situation is more complicated: the
statistical variation between biometric measurements is
user specific, i.e., some users inherently provide more
strongly correlated measurements than others [23]. Fur-
thermore, depending upon the feature extraction algo-
rithm, some elements of a feature vector may remain
more stable across multiple measurements than oth-
ers [11]. The statistical variation is typically estimated
at the enrollment stage by taking several samples from
the individual being enrolled. This allows the system
designer to set (possibly user-specific) parameters, e.g.,
acceptance thresholds, to accommodate the typical varia-
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tion between enrollment and probe biometrics. Biometric
feature extraction is a rich area of research, and several
algorithms have been proposed for extracting discrim-
inable information from fingerprints [24], irises [25, 26],
faces [27–29], speech [30] and more exotic biometric
modalities such as gait [31, 32] and ECGs [33].
In addition to FRR/FAR considerations we can also
ask what statistical properties should the features have
to guarantee low privacy leakage? In the binary example
of Figure 2, it would be desirable to have the value of
a bit at position i in the feature vector be statistically
independent of the value of a bit at position j. This would
ensure that a compromised feature bit does not reveal any
information about hitherto uncompromised feature bits.
For the same reason, the value of a feature bit in Alice’s
feature vector should ideally be independent of the value
of any bit in Bob’s feature vector [10]. Designing feature
vectors to possess such privacy-preserving properties
forces a compromise between discriminability, i.e., the
independence of the feature values, and robustness, i.e.,
the reproducibility of the feature values. This, in turn,
affects the accuracy (FRR and FAR) of the system,
highlighting the fact that privacy comes at the price of
performance.
In secure biometrics, the derived features must satisfy
an additional constraint: The operations performed on the
features during secure access control protocols must be
permissible within the architecture of the encoding and
decision modules of Figure 1(a). For instance, minutia
points are the de facto standard features for highly
accurate fingerprint matching, but they cannot directly be
encrypted for use in secure biometric matching, because
the mathematics required to model minutiae movement,
deletion and insertion — such as factor graphs [34] —
are very difficult to implement in the encrypted domain.
In response to this problem, biometrics researchers have
used methods that extract equal-length feature vectors
from biometrics [35–38]. The idea behind this is to turn
biometric matching into a problem of computing distance
(e.g., Euclidean, Hamming, or Manhattan), an operation
that is feasible within secure biometric architectures.
Figure 3 shows an example in which a fingerprint im-
pression is transformed into a binary feature vector that
is suitable for Hamming distance-based matching, and
amenable to many secure biometrics architectures [10].
It must be noted that imposing constraints on the feature
space makes secure architectures feasible, but forces the
designer to accept a degradation in the FAR-versus-
FRR tradeoff in comparison to that which would have
been achieved in an unconstrained setup. This degra-
dation in the tradeoff is depicted in the ROC curve
in Figure 1(b). As an example, by fusing scores from
multiple sophisticated fingerprint matchers, it is possible
for conventional fingerprint access control systems to
achieve an EER below 0.5% [39]. In contrast, to the
best of our knowledge, no secure fingerprint biometric
scheme has yet been reported with an EER below 1%.
III. SECURE BIOMETRICS ARCHITECTURES
We now turn to methods for converting biometric
features into “secure” signals that can be stored in the
biometric database, to be used for authentication. We
briefly cover the four most prominent classes mentioned
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in the introduction, treating each as a specific manifes-
tation of the unified framework of Figure 1(a).
A. Secure Sketches
A secure sketch-based system derives information –
called a sketch or helper data S – from Alice’s enroll-
ment biometric A and stores it in the access control
database [40], as shown in Figure 4. The decision func-
tion tests whether the probe biometric D is consistent
with the sketch and grants access when it is. The sketch
S should be constructed so that it reveals little or no
information about A
Secure sketches can be generated in several ways, for
example, by computing a small number of quantized
random projections of a biometric feature vector [4].
A particularly instructive method – one that shows the
connections between secure sketches and the fuzzy com-
mitment architecture – employs error correcting codes
(ECCs). The secure sketch is constructed as a syndrome
of an ECC with parity check matrix H, given by
S = HA. The idea is that a legitimate probe biometric
D = B would be a slightly error prone version of
A. Therefore, authentication can be accomplished by
attempting to decode A given D and S. Secure sketches
constructed in this way provide information theoretic
security and privacy guarantees that are functions of the
dimension of the ECC. They also suggest an interesting
interpretation in which S is a Slepian-Wolf encoded
version of A [41]. Thus, biometric authentication is
akin to Slepian-Wolf decoding [10]. This observation
paves the way for implementations based on graphical
models, e.g., belief propagation decoding coupled with
appropriately augmented LDPC code graphs [9].
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Fig. 5. An abstract representation of the ECC-based secure sketch
authentication system, depicting the acceptance regions in relation to
the enrollment biometric and its coset.
A natural question to ask here is: “How does the deci-
sion box know that it has correctly decoded A given D
and S.” In practice, this question is answered by storing
a cryptographic hash of A on the device along with the
stored data S. Then, assuming no hash collisions, if the
cryptographic hash of the decoded vector matches the
stored hash, the device determines that authentication is
successful. However, due to the use of a cryptographic
hash, this system is only computationally secure and
not information-theoretically secure. But, as we will
describe, an information-theoretic test for the recovery
of A can be constructed by considering the geometry
of the ECC. The result is an information-theoretically
secure solution that retains the FAR/FRR performance
of the design that uses cryptographic hashes. This leads
to an interesting coding theory exercise, the details of
which are worked out in the sidebar: “A Linear ECC-
based Secure Sketch Authentication System”. For an
implementation of an ECC-based secure sketch-based
system see [11]. There, using an irregular LDPC code
of length 150 bits, an EER of close to 3% is achieved.
Begin Sidebar Inset #A: A linear ECC-based secure
sketch authentication system
The underlying geometry of a secure sketch system
based on a binary linear ECC is illustrated in Figure 5.
For simplicity, we focus on keyless systems, i.e., ones
that do not involve the secret key K. We consider
binary biometric sequences A of length n. The black
circle bounds the set of all length-n binary words. The
black dots represent 2n−m codewords that correspond to
the null space of an m × n binary parity check matrix
H of rank m.
7Enrollment via ECC: The blue cross (arbitrarily
placed at the center) indicates the enrollment biometric
feature vector A. Enrollment consists of mapping A
to its m-bit syndrome S := HA where operations are
in the binary field F2. The set of 2n−m binary words
that are mapped by H to S form the enrollment coset,
of which A is a member. The blue dots represent the
other members of the coset that, together with the blue
cross, form the entire enrollment coset. Knowledge of
stored information S is equivalent to knowledge of the
members of this coset and hence is available to the
decision module.
Authentication: The first step in authenticating a
probe vector D, is to perform syndrome decoding to
recover Â, the estimate of the enrollment vector. This
is the element of the coset specified by S that is closest
to D in Hamming distance. The probe is accepted as
authentic if the normalized Hamming distance between
this estimate and the probe is less than a threshold τ ,
i.e., 1ndH(Â,D) < τ , where τ ∈ (p, 0.5); otherwise
the probe is rejected. Thus, the system accepts a
probe if it is within a certain distance of the coset
of S, and otherwise rejects it. In Figure 5, each blue
dashed circle represents the boundary of an acceptance
region associated with a single coset member that is
produced by syndrome decoding and the threshold test.
The overall acceptance region is the union of these
individual acceptance regions. The green dot is an
example of a probe vector D that will be accepted and
the magenta dot an example of a D that will be rejected.
FRR: The probe D = B of a legitimate user is a
noisy version of A. Ideally this is equivalent to the
output of a BSC-p channel with input A, so that the bits
of the noise vector (A⊕B) are independent Bernoulli-p
random variables independent of A. For any A, the
FRR is equal to the probability that the noise pushes it
outside the acceptance region. Since the code is linear,
all cosets are translations of the coset of all codewords
whose syndrome is zero. Hence the FRR is the same
for all A. It turns out that H can be designed to make
FRR exponentially small in n (for large enough n) if (i)
the threshold τ ∈ (p, 0.5) and (ii) the rate (n − m)/n
of the ECC is strictly smaller than the capacity of a
BSC-τ channel [21].
FAR: An attacker unassisted by any compromised
information must pick an attack probe uniformly over
the space of all length-n binary words. The FAR is thus
given by the ratio of the total volume of the acceptance
spheres to the overall volume of the space. Coding
theory tells us that, in high dimensions (n  1), if the
rate (n −m)/n of the ECC is strictly smaller than the
capacity of a BSC-τ channel, the coset members can be
well-separated and the volume outside of the acceptance
spheres can be made to dominate the volume inside
them. Thus, the FAR can also be made exponentially
small in n by suitably designing the ECC [21].
Privacy leakage: Knowledge of S would reveal
to an attacker that A belongs to the set of 2n−m
blue points as opposed to the set of all 2n binary
words. If A is equally likely to be any n-bit word,
then this corresponds to an information-theoretic
privacy leakage rate (in bits) of I(A;S) = m =
log2(#all binary sequences)− log2(#blue points).
SAR: From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that an
attacker who is assisted by compromised information
(either A or S) can determine the acceptance regions
and choose an attack probe that falls within them.
Thus, given such side information, the SAR of this
system is one. This property, however, is not unique
to this system, but a general drawback of any keyless
system [21]. A two-factor scheme partially addresses
this drawback by using a key K independent of A in
the enrollment state, keeping SAR down to the nominal
FAR when A is compromised. However, revealing S to
the adversary still results in SAR = 1.
End Sidebar Inset #A
The preceding explanation assumes a keyless secure
sketch architecture. However, as shown in Figure 4,
a two-factor implementation is possible by using an
independent key K provided by the system or chosen
by the user. The advantage of the two-factor architecture
is enhanced privacy and security, as well as revocabil-
ity of a compromised secure biometric S or key K.
Specifically, when the adversary discovers either K or
S, but not both, the two-factor system suffers no privacy
leakage. Furthermore, when the adversary discovers K
or the biometric A, but not both, the SAR is still
no larger than the nominal FAR of the system [21].
In other words, the second factor K prevents privacy
leakage while preventing degradation in the biometric
authentication performance [14]. Lastly, if only either
K or S is compromised by an attacker, the enrollment
can be revoked by discarding the other factor. The user
can then refresh their enrollment without any security or
privacy degradation. The penalty of two-factor system
is a loss of convenience, since the user must either
memorize K or carry it on a smart card.
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Fig. 6. In fuzzy commitment, encoding involves binding the
biometric features to a randomly generated vector Z resulting in
stored data S. The decision module checks whether Z is exactly
recovered using the probe feature vector and the stored data. A two-
factor realization with a user-specific key in addition to the biometric
feature is also possible.
B. Fuzzy Commitment
Fuzzy commitment involves binding a secret message
to the enrollment biometric which can later be recovered
with a legitimate probe biometric to perform authentica-
tion [7, 8]. As depicted in Figure 6, Alice binds her bio-
metric feature vector A to a randomly generated vector
Z, producing the data S which is stored in a database
as the secure biometric. Again, the encoding function
should ensure that S leaks little or no information about
A or Z. To perform authentication, a user claiming to be
Alice provides a probe biometric feature vector D and
the device attempts to recover Z. Access is granted only
when there is exact recovery of the message Z, which
would happen only if D is sufficiently similar to A.
There are several ways to bind a secret message to the
enrollment biometric. One such method uses quantiza-
tion index modulation (QIM) [42], in which the biomet-
ric features are quantized in such a way that the choice
of the quantizer is driven by the secret message [43].
Another method uses error correcting codes. We explain
this ECC embodiment below because it clarifies the basic
concepts of fuzzy commitment using familiar ideas from
channel coding. Assuming that all vectors are binary,
consider a simple example wherein the secure biometric
is computed as S = GTZ⊕A, where G is the generator
matrix of an ECC. During authentication, the access
control device receives the probe vector D and computes
S⊕D which results in a noisy codeword. The noise is
contributed by the difference between A and D. Then,
using classical ECC decoding, the device attempts to
decode the random message Z and allows access only if
it is successful. The ECC-based implementation provides
concrete information theoretic guarantees of privacy and
security depending upon the parameters of the selected
ECC. In fact, in terms of the FRR, FAR, privacy leakage,
and SAR this ECC-based construction is equivalent to
the ECC-based secure sketch construction discussed ear-
lier [21]. They are not identical however, as the storage
requirement of fuzzy commitment is generally greater
than that of secure sketch.
An alternative way of understanding the ECC-based
implementation of fuzzy commitment is to view it as a
method of extracting a secret Z by means of polynomial
interpolation [7, 8]. Suppose that the decoder is given a
large constellation of candidate feature points (vectors)
containing a few genuine points and a large number of
“chaff” points, generated for the purpose of hiding the
relevant points. The secret can be recovered only by
interpolating a specific polynomial that passes through
the relevant feature points for the user being tested.
It is inefficient to perform polynomial interpolation by
brute force. Fortunately, polynomial interpolation can be
efficiently accomplished by ECC decoding, for example,
Reed-Solomon decoding using the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [44]. This realization has inspired many im-
plementations of fuzzy commitment, primarily for fin-
gerprints, where polynomial interpolation is applied to a
collection of genuine and chaff points constructed from
locations and orientations of fingerprint minutiae [1,
2, 5, 6]. An example implementation of such a fuzzy
commitment scheme appears in [2], wherein a (511,19)
BCH code is employed for polynomial interpolation; ex-
periments show that when the degree of the interpolated
polynomial is increased, the matching becomes more
stringent, reducing the FAR, but increasing the FRR.
Based on the relationships between the ECC-based
constructions discussed so far, it becomes clear that
the fuzzy commitment is closely related to the secure
sketches. In fact, it is possible to show that if a secure
sketch scheme is given, it can be used to construct a
fuzzy commitment scheme [40]. As explained in the case
of secure sketch, in practical systems, a cryptographic
hash of Z is stored on the device along with S, to verify
correct recovery of Z. Furthermore, a two-factor scheme
that utilizes a key K independent of the enrollment
vector A can similarly improve security and privacy
performance, as well as enable revocability.
C. Biometrics as Secure Multiparty Computation
This architecture involves finding the distance between
enrollment and probe biometric features in the encrypted
domain. There has been intense research activity recently
on accomplishing this using public-key homomorphic
cryptosystems. These allow an operation on the under-
lying plaintexts — such as addition or multiplication
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Fig. 7. In biometrics based on multiparty computation, enrollment
involves encrypting the biometric features. The authentication deci-
sion involves encrypted-domain distance computation and followed
by a comparison protocol between the claimant, who possesses a
secret decryption key L and the database server which only sees
encrypted data.
— to be carried out by performing a suitable operation
on the ciphertexts. To fix ideas, consider the following
simple example. Suppose the length-n enrollment feature
vector A is encrypted elementwise using an additively
homomorphic cryptosystem and the resulting ciphertext
S is stored in the database of the access control system,
as shown in Figure 7. An additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem, e.g., the Paillier cryptosystem [45], satisfies
E(a)E(b) = E(a + b) for integers a, b and encryption
function E(·).
A realistic assumption in our simple example is that
the encryption key is public, while the decryption key
L is available only to the individual attempting to au-
thenticate. Thus, by construction, this secure biometrics
architecture results in two-factor systems, in which the
first factor is a biometric token and the second factor
is a privately held decryption key for a homomorphic
cryptosystem. Suppose a user claiming to be Alice (say)
provides a probe feature vector D for authentication.
Since the encryption key is public, the device can encrypt
elements of probe biometric D and compute the squared
distance between A and D in the encrypted domain
using the additively homomorphic property as:
E
(
n∑
i=1
a2i
)
E
(
n∑
i=1
d2i
)
n∏
i=1
E(ai)
−2di
= E
(
n∑
i=1
(ai − di)2
)
.
The device then executes a privacy-preserving com-
parison protocol with the user to be authenticated to
determine whether the distance is below a threshold.
The protocol ensures that the claimant does not discover
the threshold, while neither the claimant nor the device
discovers the actual value of the distance or any of the ai.
If the distance is below the threshold, access is granted.
Clearly, the claimant – whether Alice or an adversary
— must use the correct decryption key, otherwise the
protocol will generate garbage values.
The example above is meant to illustrate the basic
concepts of secure biometrics based on multiparty com-
putation. Many extensions of the above scheme have
been studied, all of which involve some form of privacy-
preserving nearest neighbor computation [16, 17, 46, 47].
The protocols apply a combination of homomorphic
encryption and garbled circuits. The latter is especially
useful in the final authentication step, i.e., performing
an encrypted-domain comparison of the distance be-
tween the enrollment and probe biometrics against a
predetermined threshold. The distance measures need
not be restricted to Euclidean distance; secure biometric
comparisons based on Hamming distance and Manhattan
(`1) distance have also been realized. Privacy-preserving
nearest-neighbor protocols such as these have been pro-
posed for various biometric modalities, for instance, face
images [18], fingerprints [17] and irises [16]. For further
details and analysis of the steps involved in the crypto-
graphic protocols for biometric authentication, we refer
the reader to a recently published survey article [48].
Privacy and security in these methods depend on
proper protocol design and key management to ensure
that the attacker does not gain access to the decryption
keys. Privacy and security guarantees are computational,
not information-theoretic, i.e., they rely on the unproven
hardness of problems such as factorization of large
numbers, the quadratic residuosity problem [45], or
the discrete logarithm problem [49]. In other words, if
Alice’s decryption key is discovered by an adversary,
then the system becomes vulnerable to a wide variety
of attacks. Depending upon his computational resources,
the adversary can now query the system using several
(possibly synthetic) candidate biometrics until access is
granted by the system, thereby resulting in a successful
attack. Further, the adversary gains a reasonable proxy
biometric vector to be used in the future to impersonate
Alice. Even though it is difficult to give concrete ex-
pressions for the SAR and the privacy leakage for such
a system, it is clear that a compromised decryption key
will significantly increase both the SAR and the privacy
leakage.
This architecture requires the database server to store
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Fig. 9. An example of a cancelable transformation of a face image.
If the stored data S is known to have been compromised, the system
administrator can revoke it, and store a different transformation as
the new enrollment.
encryptions of biometric features, therefore the storage
cost is high owing to ciphertext expansion. This is
because of the large key sizes used in the privacy-
preserving protocols; typical values are 1024 or 2048
bits [48]. The computational complexity is also much
higher than the other architectures due to the high
overhead of interactive encrypted-domain protocols.
D. Cancelable Biometrics
Cancelable biometrics refers to a class of techniques
in which the enrollment biometric signal is inten-
tionally distorted before it is stored in the biometric
database [50]. This architecture is depicted in Figure 8.
The distorting function is repeatable, so that it can be
applied again to the probe biometric, facilitating compar-
ison with the distorted enrollment biometric. Further, the
distorting function is intended to be a non-invertible and
“revocable” mapping. This means that, if Alice’s stored
distorted biometric is known to have been compromised,
a system administrator can cancel her enrollment data,
apply a fresh distorting function to Alice’s biometric,
and store the result as her new enrollment.
The most popular methods of implementing cance-
lable biometrics involve non-invertible mappings applied
to rectangular tessellations of face or fingerprint im-
ages [50], salting of biometric features with a secret
key [51], and computing quantized random projections
of biometric feature vectors [52]. An example of a can-
celable transformation applied to a face image, similar
to schemes proposed in [50], is shown in Figure 9. To
authenticate in this architecture, a user must provide their
biometric measurement along with correct distorting
transformation that should be applied to the measure-
ment. Thus, by construction, these are two-factor systems
in which the second factor K is a secret value held by
the user which indexes the user-specific deformation, or
salting key, or the realization of a random matrix. The
secret value can be in the form of a memorized PIN
number or a longer key held on a smart card.
As would be expected, the choice of the space of
distorting functions affects the accuracy, i.e., the FAR,
FRR and EER for the system under consideration. The
non-invertibility of the distorting function ensures that
an adversary cannot recover the underlying biometric
by reading the database of distorted biometrics. In other
words, privacy leakage can be low, or zero, depending
on the implementation. Most importantly, the secrecy of
the chosen distorting function is critical as far as the
SAR is concerned. In the various cancelable biomet-
rics implementations, if the chosen non-invertible image
transform, or the salting key, or the realization of the
random projection matrix are revealed, the adversary’s
task is considerably simplified: he needs to find some
biometric signal that, when transformed according to
the revealed distorting function, yields an output that
is similar to the stored enrollment data. This would be
sufficient for the adversary to gain unauthorized access.
Though many cancelable transformations have been
proposed, formal proofs regarding the accuracy, privacy
and security of these methods are elusive. In other
words, given a distorted biometric database, we do not
always have a quantitative measure of how difficult it
is to discover the distorting function and subsequently
compromise a legitimate user’s biometric. Further, even
given the distorting function, indexed by the secret key
K, we do not always have a quantitative measure of
how easy it is to gain unauthorized access to the system.
Finally, it is not always possible to quantify the degrada-
tion (if any) in the FAR-versus-FRR performance when
when a user’s enrollment data is repeatedly revoked
and reassigned. Nevertheless, the low implementation
complexity, the large variety of distorting transforma-
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Fig. 10. An adversary can compromise security and privacy by
attacking multiple devices at which the victim is enrolled.
tions, and the conceptual simplicity of the administrative
tasks needed to revoke compromised templates makes
cancelable biometrics an attractive architecture. This is
especially true in scenarios in which a user has enrolled
the same biometric – e.g., her index finger – at multiple
access control devices.
IV. MULTIPLE SECURE BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
We now consider a topic that is extremely important
but remains little investigated, namely the implications
for security and privacy when a user has enrolled a bio-
metric on several access control devices. As a concrete
example, say that Alice has enrolled her fingerprints at
her bank, at her gym, on her laptop, and at her apartment
complex. In this case, an adversary may first attempt to
compromise the systems that have less stringent security
requirements, perhaps the apartment complex and/or the
gym, as shown in Figure 10. The adversary could then
use the information acquired to attack the more sensitive
systems; for instance to gain access to Alice’s bank
accounts. There is an inherent tension between the need
for security from an attack spanning multiple systems
and the desire to preserve as much privacy as possible
in the face of one or more systems being compromised.
We illustrate this tradeoff with a simplified example in
the sidebar on “Tradeoff between security and privacy
leakage in multiple biometric systems”.
Begin Sidebar B: Tradeoff between security and
privacy leakage in multiple biometric systems
We use the secure sketch architecture for this discus-
sion. Let the binary ECC used in enrollment be of length
four and span a subspace of dimension two. This means
there are 22 = 4 codewords. We consider the [4, 2] code
described by the parity-check matrix H where
H =
[
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
]
.
The codewords of this code are C =
{[0000]T , [1110]T , [1101]T , [0011]T }. As an example of
an enrollment let A = [1011]T , yielding as stored data
the syndrome S = HA = [1 0]T . The set of candidate
biometrics that share this syndrome (coset members)
are P = {[1011]T , [0101]T , [0110]T , [1000]T }.
For simplicity, we set the decision threshold for
authentication, i.e., the radius of the blue dashed circles
in Figure 5, to be τ = 0. In this case, access will be
given only if the probe D ∈ P .
Now, consider three additional secure sketch systems
that use H1, H2, H3, where H1 = H,
H2 =
[
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
]
, and H3 =
[
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
]
.
For the same enrollment biometric A = [1011]T , the
syndromes, codewords and cosets are respectively given
by S1 = S, C1 = C, and P1 = P; S2 = [1 1]T ,
C2 = {[0000]T , [1101]T , [0111]T , [1010]T }, and P2 =
{[1011]T , [0110]T , [1100]T , [0001]T }; S3 = [0 0]T and
C3 = P3 = {[0000]T , [1100]T , [1011]T , [0111]T }. The
geometry of the cosets Pi is shown in Figure 11. There
is linear dependence between the codes defined by H1
and H2 because of the shared first row and we observe
|C1∩C2| = 2 > 1. In contrast, the rows of H1 and H3 are
linearly independent and |C1 ∩ C3| = 1 due to only one
intersection at the origin, [0000]T . As we discuss next,
linear independence between the parity check matrices
makes the systems more secure, i.e., it reduces the SAR,
but increases the potential for privacy leakage.
First consider the SAR. Say that the original system,
encoded using H, is compromised, i.e., an attacker has
learned the stored data S. Note that the attacker can
gain access to System 1 with probability one, or SAR
= 1. This follows because H1 = H. With knowledge
of S, the attacker knows P1 = P and can gain access
by uniformly setting D to be any member of P . Recall
that access is granted only if D ∈ P since we have
set τ = 0. If, instead of System 1, the attacker wants to
access System 2 using the same attack, i.e., by uniformly
setting D to be any member of P . In this case, SAR
= |P ∩ P2|/|P2| = 0.5. Finally, if the attacker wants
to access System 3, using the same strategy will result
in an even smaller SAR of 0.25. Note that 0.25 is also
the nominal FAR for System 3, and so the attacker does
no better than random guessing. The decrease in SAR
is due to the decrease in linear dependence between
the parity check matrices: reduced dependence implies
reduced overlap in the respective cosets.
Next consider the privacy leakage. Compromising the
original system meant that the attacker has discovered S,
thus 2 out of the 4 bits of A have been leaked. Suppose
that, in addition to the original compromised system, the
attacker could pick one more system to compromise.
Which system should he choose to obtain the most
additional information about A? Observe that if the ith
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Fig. 11. This figure depicts the three codebook example of the
sidebar to illustrate the design tension between maximizing security
and privacy. This example concerns the space of 4-bit biometrics,
which is illustrated by the 16 points arranged on the vertices of a
tesseract. The three cosets (with respect to each code) corresponding
to enrollment biometric A = [1 0 1 1]T are depicted in this figure.
system is chosen for compromise, then A ∈ P ∩ Pi,
so he wants the intersection set to be as small as
possible. He learns nothing more about A by compro-
mising System 1 since |P ∩ P1| = |P| = 4. However,
as shown in Figure 11, by choosing to compromise
System 2 instead, his uncertainty of discovering A is
reduced by one bit because |P ∩ P2| = 2. Even better,
by choosing to compromise System 3, his uncertainty
is completely eliminated and he discovers A because
|P ∩ P3| = |{A}| = 1. Thus, the attacker would benefit
the most by compromising the system with the most
linear independence in its parity check matrix.
End Sidebar Inset # B
Using secure sketch for the purpose of illustration, this
example shows how linearly independent parity check
matrices make the systems most resistant to attack, but
also most susceptible to privacy leakage. For simplicity,
our example assumed identical enrollment vectors A for
all systems and a strict threshold τ = 0; the tension
between privacy leakage and SAR also exists when the
enrollment vectors used by the different systems are
noisy versions of each other and when the threshold τ
is set to some nonzero value [21, 53].
Analysis of linkage attacks can be further complicated
when the systems involved use different architectures.
For example, one system may use secure sketch, another
fuzzy commitment, and a third cancelable biometrics.
Even when all systems have the same architecture, it
is still a difficult problem to select biometric encoding
parameters on each device to achieve a desired tradeoff
between security and privacy. In the analysis of [12,
13], information theoretically achievable outer bounds
are derived for the privacy-security region for multiple
systems. However, practical code designs that achieve
these bounds remain elusive.
It is also natural to ask what advantages and disadvan-
tages result when, in the context of multiple systems,
two-factor variants of the biometric architectures are
used. For secure sketches and fuzzy commitments, each
device can generate a different key then assigned to
the user. If the key or the stored data — but not
both — is compromised, there is no privacy leakage;
the enrollment can be revoked and new keys and new
stored data can be assigned. However, a (pessimistic)
information theoretic argument shows that the SAR
still saturates to one whenever the stored data is com-
promised, since an unbounded adversary could always
find an acceptable probe biometric (and key) through
exhaustive search [21]. In the case of secure multiparty
computation-based systems, the architecture extends in
a straightforward way to multiple systems: the user can
simply choose a different public-private key pair at each
device. As long as computational privacy guarantees
hold, this strategy ensures that the SAR remains low
for devices whose decryption keys are not compromised.
However, if even one of the private keys is revealed, the
privacy leakage could be significant. This is because the
adversary can access unencrypted information about the
user’s biometric feature vector during the private distance
computation protocol or during the private comparison
protocol. In the case of cancelable biometrics, the user
may employ a different non-invertible transformation at
each device, thereby ensuring that the SAR remains low
for devices whose specific transformation or stored data
are not compromised. However, as noted earlier, the
privacy leakage in the case of a compromised transfor-
mation could be significant.
V. SUMMARY AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this article, we have presented the main concepts
that underlie secure biometric systems and have de-
scribed the principal architectures by casting them as
realizations of a single, general authentication frame-
work. Our objectives have been, first, to acquaint read-
ers with the differences between secure and traditional
biometric authentication; next to familiarize them with
the goals, ideas and performance metrics common to all
realizations of secure biometrics; and finally to introduce
them to the ways in which the various realizations
differ. Table I provides a high-level summary of the
secure biometrics architectures discussed, comparing and
contrasting their security assumptions, tools, complexity,
salient features and open problems.
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The study of secure biometric systems is a topical and
fertile research area. Recent advances have addressed
many aspects of secure biometrics including new
information theoretic analyses, the emergence of new
biometric modalities, the implementations of new
feature extraction schemes, and the construction of fast,
encrypted-domain protocols for biometric matching.
That said, much work remains to be done before secure
biometric access control becomes commonplace. We
now describe some research directions.
Biometric Feature Spaces: In almost all secure
biometric system implementations, a traditional
biometric feature extraction technique is modified to
make it compatible with one of the privacy architectures
that we have covered. As observed in the article, the
incorporation of a “secure” aspect to the biometric
authentication system impacts the underlying tradeoff
between FAR and FRR. The price of privacy is most
often some drop in authentication performance. The
development of biometric feature spaces that provide
excellent discriminative properties, while simultaneously
enabling efficient privacy-preserving implementations,
is the among the most important current problems
in the area. This is especially important when the
aim is to preserve discriminative properties in the
context of multiple systems in simultaneous use. As
discussed in the article, the effort involved would not
be limited to signal processing algorithms, but would
also require evaluation of biometric architecture using,
for example, information theoretic or game-theoretic
problem formulations.
Alignment and Pre-processing: Much current work
on implementation of secure biometric systems ignores
the fact that, prior to feature extraction and matching
in traditional biometric systems, a complicated and
usually non-linear procedure is necessary to align the
probe and enrollment biometrics. Traditional biometric
schemes can store alignment parameters such as shifts
and scale factors in the clear. But, for a secure biometric
system, storing such data in the clear can be a potential
weakness. On the other hand, incorrect alignment
drastically reduces the accuracy of biometric matching.
Thus, it is necessary to develop biometric matching
schemes that are either robust to misalignment, such as
the spectral minutiae method [36], or allow alignment
to be performed under privacy constraints.
New Standardization Efforts: In addition to the
development of novel approaches and methods,
widespread deployment of secure biometric systems will
demand interoperability across sensors, storage facilities,
and computing equipment. It will also require an
established methodology for evaluating the performance
of secure biometric systems according to the metrics
discussed herein. To this end, new standardization
activity has been undertaken in several domestic and
international bodies, composed of participants from
industry, government and academia [54, 55]. In the
coming years, standardization efforts are expected to
address the task of establishing guidelines and normative
procedures for testing and evaluation of various secure
biometrics architectures.
Attack Analysis and Prevention: In this article,
we have covered security attacks and privacy attacks,
wherein the attacker attempts to extract information
about the stored data, the biometric features and/or the
keys and tries to gain unauthorized access to the system.
In these attack scenarios, the attacker does not disrupt or
alter the system components themselves — for example,
change the ECC parity check matrix, thresholds, keys,
or the biometric database, or arbitrarily deviate from the
encrypted-domain protocols and so on. A comprehensive
discussion of such attacks, including collusion with
system administrators, and network-related attacks such
as Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks appears in [56].
Modeling, experimental analysis and prevention of such
attacks remains a very challenging topic in academia
and industry.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption: In the secure
computation community, much excitement has been
generated by the discovery of fully homomorphic
encryption, which allows arbitrary polynomials to be
computed in the encrypted domain [57, 58]. Though
current implementations are exceedingly complex, faster
and more efficient constructions are emerging. These
promise to be able, eventually, to compute complicated
functions of the enrollment and probe biometrics — not
just distances — using a simple protocol where nearly
all the computation can be securely out-sourced to a
database server.
Emerging Biometric Modalities: Through the
proliferation of tablet computers, smartphones, and
motion sensor devices for gaming, many people
have become familiar with touch and gesture-based
interfaces. This has led to the emergence of new
biometric modalities. Authentication can be based
on hand movements and multi-touch gestures,
leveraging techniques from machine learning and
computer vision [59, 60]. These modalities also have
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an interesting property from the point of view of
cancelability: compromised templates can be revoked
and renewed merely by having a user choose a different
gesture. Aspects of a gesture, such as body shape
and the relative sizes of limbs and fingers, generate
features that are irrevocable, just as with traditional
biometrics. Incorporating the dynamics of gestures
into the authentication process has been shown to
improve FRR-FAR tradeoffs [60]. In principle, there
are an unlimited number of ways in which one could
personalize gestures that are reliable, easy to remember,
reproducible, and pleasant to work with. The study of
gesture-based biometric modalities is a nascent area of
research.
Related Applications: As noted in the beginning
of the article, many of the principles discussed here
extend to secure biometric identification systems. A
practical concern is that identification involves matching
the test biometric against the entire database, which
means that the decision module in Figure 1 will be
executed once for each identity in the database. For
large databases, ECC decoding or secure multiparty
computation will be prohibitively complex unless fast,
parallelizable algorithms are developed to compensate
for the increased computational overhead. Other than
authentication, these methods extend with minor
modifications to the related problem of secret key
generation from biometrics. Furthermore, the concepts
and methods are readily applicable in emerging
authentication scenarios that do not involve human
biometrics, e.g., device forensics and anti-counterfeiting
technologies based on physical unclonable functions
(PUFs) [61–64].
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